Malaysian State Elections 2023: A Barometer for Anwar’s Unity Government?
Malaysia’s state elections will be held on August 12, 2023 in the 6 states of Kedah, Selangor, Penang, Negeri Sembilan, Kelantan, and Terengganu. As the ruling Unity Government (UG) in Malaysia prepares for these upcoming elections, a crucial question arises: How many supporters of Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Barisan Nasional (BN) will “transfer” their votes to their former political rivals? Of the six states, three are governed by the opposition party Perikatan Nasional (PN) – Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu – while the other three – Penang, Selangor, and Negeri Sembilan – are governed by Pakatan Harapan (PH).
The upcoming state elections serve as the first referendum to gauge support for the UG since GE15. Although the results of the state elections are unlikely to affect the stability of the federal government, they will likely test the cohesion of the UG and the main opposition bloc, PN, causing allies to reassess their support for their respective coalitions. For instance, the election results will likely influence UMNO's strategic thinking when it comes to collaborating with PH in future elections, while also affecting the confidence of UMNO leaders and grassroots members within the party. Most significantly, a positive result for the UG will also create more opportunities to introduce meaningful economic reforms, such as the rationalization of general subsidies towards more targeted programs.
In context: One year on from GE15
Prior to the 2022 Malaysian General Election (GE15), the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) announced that the state governments of Kelantan, Kedah, and Terengganu would not hold an early election to end the term governance of their state assemblies. Hence, the current state assemblies would remain in office to complete their full term. On the other hand, PH also announced that the state governments of Selangor, Penang, and Negeri Sembilan would also remain in office to complete their full terms. Therefore, in December 2022, the Election Commission (EC) stated that all 6 state elections are to be held concurrently to ensure better coordination. The term of these governments end in 2023 and consequently, have dissolved their Legislative Assemblies (DUN) and called for state elections.
While GE15 saw a surge in participation from Malay voters and is likely to persist through the upcoming state elections, this optimism comes with a plethora of existing concerns. Within Anwar’s own coalition, he faces tension from ideologically opposed groups, while the opposition coalition continues to pressure him on challenges such as the rising cost of living in Malaysia against a backdrop of a depreciating Malaysian Ringgit. At the same time, the lack of job opportunities, especially for young people, presents an additional challenge for everyday Malaysians, especially when coupled with a perceived lack of effort in combating corruption within the government.
Growing Electoral Complexities
Last year, PAS made significant gains in non-traditional constituencies highlighting a shift in the political landscape. Progressive media and parties have termed the perceived ‘resurgence’ of political activism from GE15 as a “Green Wave,” viewing it as a possible indication of the increasing influence of Political Islam, or even the emergence of an “Islamic Fascism” in extreme cases. Many are predicting that this election will continue to exacerbate religious divides. Analysts are focusing on Kelantan, Kedah and Terengganu, the muslim and ‘Malay heartland’, because Malay-dominated electorates have traditionally voted in line with pro-Malay policies, and could once again challenge the multi-racial coalition government led by Anwar.
Despite this, research has shown that recent patterns in voting behaviour are more complex than religious concerns. Academic research on GE15 suggests that “economic grievances played an important role in the last-minute swing to PN” and that PN effectively used various social media outlets, especially TikTok, in campaigning to garner support from younger voters. Former Bangi MP Ong Kian Ming has also referred to the “Green Wave” narrative as a myth, arguing that the results of GE15 were “part of a larger trend of increased political competition in Malaysia and the collapse of support for a once-dominant BN-UMNO”. The assumption that PN will automatically win most of the Malay votes, therefore, or that PH will have an unconditional stronghold on the non-Malay vote is unlikely to pan out. In actuality, the electoral landscape has become much more competitive and electoral outcomes will depend on a multitude of factors. While religion is an important facet in voting behaviours, it is by no means determinative.
Looking forward
Malaysia is currently positioned at pivotal crossroads, with this upcoming state elections serving as a crucial gauge of the trajectory of Malaysia’s political culture. Political analysts have noted that Selangor is expected to be the most fiercely fought, with the opposition PN able to win 6 out of the 22 federal seats in last year’s election.
Former Minister of Health Khairy Jamaluddin has painted three scenarios for the upcoming state elections.
The first demonstrates a best-case scenario for PH-BN, in which PH retains a 95% vote share among non-Malays while the BN attracts most of the Malay supporters in the country. The most optimistic outcome along these lines shows the current PH-BN coalition winning 55 out of the 56 state assembly seats.
The second scenario reflects a more competitive election, with lower success for PH-BN. He cites that this is the most probable outcome if the campaign momentum starts to favour PN, although the current coalition would still prevail with a 34-seat majority.
The last scenario exhibits a bleak picture for Anwar, with PN successfully capturing the key state of Selangor (a state that has usually had a majority under PH-majority coalitions) by attracting a majority of the Malay vote share, thereby swinging the elections in PN’s favour.
The key state of Selangor will therefore be critical for understanding the success of Anwar’s short time in government, but will not necessarily be a barometer of ethno-religious nationalism. Instead, campaigning and economic management will also play crucial roles in an increasingly complex electoral field.